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This article defends the Negative View of natural selection explanation, according to which
natural selection cannot explain of any given individual why it has the traits it does. Over the
years, this view has been criticized on empirical, metaphysical, and explanatory grounds.
I review the debate and offer additional reasons for rejecting the empirical and metaphysical
objections. The explanatory objection, which holds that the Negative View is rooted in a
flawed account of contrastive explanation, initially seems plausible. However, I argue that
a closer consideration of the desiderata of contrastive explanation shows that this objection
fails as well.1. The “Negative View” of Selectionist Explanation and Its Critics.
Consider the contrastive explanandum “Why does Rose always have blue-
eyed partners rather than brown-eyed ones?”Suppose the answer is simply that
Rose has a strong preference for blue-eyed partners over brown-eyed ones. At
first glance, it might seem that this answer to the question about all of Rose’s
partners is also an answer to the singular variant “Why is Rose’s current part-
ner, Thom, blue-eyed rather than brown-eyed?” However, a moment’s reflec-
tion teaches us that this is incorrect. Thom was already blue-eyed before Rose
set her eyes on him, and he would have been blue-eyed if Rose’s partner pref-
erences had been different. And if Rose’s partner selection regime does not
make a difference to Thom’s eye color, it does not explain why his eyes are
one color rather than another. Thus, although Rose’s partner selection regime*To contact the author, please write to: Department of Science Education, Section for His-
tory and Philosophy of Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark; e-mail: jw@ind.ku
.dk.
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NATURAL SELECTION AND CONTRASTIVE EXPLANATION 413helps explain a contrastive fact about a population (why all her partners have
been blue-eyed rather than brown-eyed) it does not help explain a contrastive
fact about a given individual in that population (why Thom is blue-eyed rather
than brown-eyed).
Elliott Sober argued that this fact about the explanatory scope of everyday
artificial selection explanations holds for selectionist explanations in general—
that is to say, it also holds for natural selection explanations (Sober 1984).1 Al-
though natural selection can explain facts about the spread of traits in a popu-
lation, it cannot explain of any particular individual in that population why it
has the traits it does. This claim about the explanatory scope of natural selec-
tion explanations has become known as the Negative View of selection (Pust
2001). We can formulate it in more precise terms as follows:1. No
1995
All Negative View: In any population P with individuals O1, ... , On in which
there has been natural selection for trait T over T 0, this process of selection
cannot explain of any individualOi that is born in Pwhy it has trait T rather
than T 0. Only inheritance and development can explain of an individual Oi
why it has the traits it does.Through the years, many critics have contended that the Negative View is
wrong. They have argued for the Positive View that natural selection explana-
tions have amore inclusive explanatory scope than artificial selection explana-
tions; the former can (at least under certain conditions) explain why individ-
uals severally have the traits they do. These critics can be classified into three
groups. Some have argued that the apparent plausibility of the Negative View
depends on empirical assumptions about organismal development that do not
apply universally. They claim that the exceptions point to a possibility for selec-
tion to explain why a given individual has the traits it does. Others have criti-
cized the Negative View for relying on a questionablemetaphysical assump-
tion, which, once discarded, opens up a space for the Positive View. Finally,
there are those who have claimed that the Negative View results from applying
flawed explanatory criteria. They argue that the adoption of improved criteria
for contrastive explanation showwhy the Positive View is true after all.
I will be brief about the first two lines of objection, which have already
been discussed at length in the literature. However, I will give additional rea-
sons for thinking that both objections miss the mark (secs. 2 and 3). Mymain
concern will be with the third line of objection, which, by pointing to issues
about the nature of (contrastive) explanation as such, presents the most direct
and targeted challenge to the Negative View (sec. 4). Moreover, I will show
that an important objection of this kind has not been rebutted by defenders ofzick (1974) and Cummins (1975) made similar observations, but Sober (1984,
) was the first to spell out and defend this view of selectionist explanation in detail.
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All uthe Negative View and therefore deserves close scrutiny (sec. 5). Yet, I will
show that ultimately this objection fails too (sec. 6). The charge that defend-
ers of the Negative View have relied on a flawed account of contrastive ex-
planation turns out to be based on a misconstrual of contrastive explanation
on the part of critics.
2. The Empirical Objection Reconsidered. Lewens (2001) outlined a sce-
nario in which it appears that natural selection helps explain why a given indi-
vidual has the traits it does: “Suppose that for a given trait t to develop normally
the individual’s environment must contain a certain proportion of conspecifics
with the same (or a different) trait. Suppose also that selection maintains that
proportion. Then we can say that changing the selective regime will alter the
proportion of conspecificswith these traits, andwill disrupt the development of
the imagined trait in the individual. . . . Selection, by ensuring the maintenance
of the necessary developmental environment for the trait, does partially ex-
plain why an individual possesses that trait” (597). Interestingly, after outlin-
ing this scenario Lewens downplays its implications for the Negative View. He
argues that since defenders of the Negative View have only argued against the
relevance of natural selection for explaining why an individual possesses a
particular genotypic trait, his scenario of natural selection affecting an indi-
vidual’s phenotypic traits does not challenge the Negative View (597).
McLoone (2013) has responded that we should take Lewens’s example
more seriously than Lewens himself does. He finds no textual evidence for
Lewens’s claim that the Negative View has only been defended in relation
to the explanation of an individual’s genotypic traits. Most defenders of the
Negative View write about the explanation of an individual’s traits as such,
without restricting their view to the genotypic level. Thus,McLoone concludes
that Lewens’s scenario presents a genuine challenge: “What was wrong with
traditional versions of the Negative View is that they ignored that phenotypes
can change in response to social environments” (345). This refutes the “tradi-
tional” version of the Negative View. Restricting the view to the explanation of
genotypes requires a substantial revision of the original thesis that Sober and
others defended.
McLoone is right to observe that theNegativeViewhas been predominantly
presented as holding for genotypic and phenotypic traits alike; my rendering
of theNegativeView in section1 reflects this “traditional” interpretation.How-
ever, I submit that McLoone is wrong to conclude that this interpretation is in
trouble because of scenarios of the sort Lewens has pointed to. He has over-
looked a distinction in the background of the debate over the scope of selec-
tionist explanation, which tells us that the Negative View does not need to
be revised to deal with scenarios of the sort that Lewens drew attention to.
Remember that the Negative View identifies a difference between the ex-
planatory scope of (natural) selection versus that of development and inheri-This content downloaded from 130.226.230.200 on September 30, 2019 05:12:01 AM
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NATURAL SELECTION AND CONTRASTIVE EXPLANATION 415tance. Whereas selectionist explanations have a population-level explanatory
scope, inheritance and developmental explanations have an individual-level
scope.What Lewens’s scenario does is identify a variety of developmental ex-
planations that involve a selective component—we could call them “selection-
on-development” explanations—and show that these have an individual-level
explanatory scope too. But given that these selection-on-development expla-
nations are a variety of developmental explanations, this should not be a sur-
prise. It confirms that whereas developmental explanations can explain of a
given individual why it acquired the traits it did in the course of ontogeny, nat-
ural selection explanations can explain why one trait rather than another
spread in a population betweengenerations. The fact that a population-level state
can feature in a contrastive explanation of an individual’s ontogeny does not
challenge the fact that it is development rather than selection that explains
why that individual has the traits it does.
3. The Metaphysical Objection Reconsidered. The second critical re-
sponse to the Negative View argues that it breaks down because of a crucial
disanalogybetween artificial andnatural selection that bears on themetaphysics
of identity. Cases of artificial selection, such as Rose’s partner selection, act on
individuals that existed before the selective episode and that either continue
to exist after the selective episode or are removed from the population by selec-
tion. Natural selection, however, often involves the reproduction of new indi-
viduals that did not exist before the selective episode. The critics argue that this
difference between artificial and natural selection affords the latter with the
individual-level explanatory scope that the former lacks.More specifically, they
argue that natural selection for trait T over T 0 can help explain why organismO
has trait T rather than T 0 because the following counterfactual is true: if the se-
lective regime had favored trait T 0over T,Owould have inherited trait T 0 rather
than T by being born to a numerically different, T 0-bearing parent. In other
words, the idea is that natural selection can help contrastively explain the traits
of a given individual because a change in selective regime canmake a difference
in whom it inherits its traits from. If this is right, then a Positive View of natural
selection seems in reach (Neander 1988, 1995a, 1995b; Matthen 1999).2
Notice that this response challenges the Negative View on a metaphysical
plane, by taking issue with an (implicit) assumption about metaphysics of iden-2. This counterfactual expresses a general condition that the critics agree on; they disagree
on how to fill in the specifics. Neander (1988, 1995a, 1995b) has contended that for natural
selection to explain an individual’s traits it also needs to have been cumulative andmust have
operated on compound traits. Matthen (1999, 2003) has suggested that sexual reproduction
is required. Subsequent discussion has clarified that none of these further conditions are es-
sential (e.g., Walsh 1998; Lewens 2001; Forber 2005). The pivotal move is the idea that re-
production opens up the counterfactual scenario inwhich a focal individual does not have its
actual parent(s) as parent(s) (Pust 2001, 2004).
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All utity: the idea that organisms necessarily have their actual parents as parents.
This stance on the metaphysics of identity is known as origin essentialism
(Kripke 1980; Pust 2001). If origin essentialism is true, a difference in the se-
lective regime cannot cause O to inherit T 0 rather than T by being born from
numerically different parents. But if origin essentialism is false, this possibility
cannot be excluded.
Why should we reject origin essentialism? The critics have argued that a
scientific account of natural selection explanation should be free from every-
day intuitions about the metaphysics of biological identity (Matthen 1999,
2003; Forber 2005). Defenders of the Negative View have justifiably pointed
out that this response fails. If the metaphysical critics wish to make a case for
the Positive View, they cannot just throw out one view on the metaphysics of
identity without offering an alternative. They will need to propose a theory of
transworld identity that supports the Positive View. That is, they must specify
the criteria by which certain individuals other than an individual’s actual par-
ents can and other cannot qualify as its counterfactual parents (Lewens 2001;
Pust 2004; Helgeson 2015).
I submit that the challenge themetaphysical critics face is even bigger. Even
if they were able to offer a plausible alternative view about which individuals
could and could not have been our parents, this would not suffice to vindicate
the Positive View. To that end, the critics would also have to show that a coun-
terfactual selective regime in favor of trait T 0 can be the cause of an actual in-
dividual being born from numerically different T 0-bearing parents. Only then
have the critics shown that a difference in natural selection can make a differ-
ence to the trait a given individual has.
So far, the metaphysical critics have not presented a theory of the meta-
physics of identity that even begins to address these questions. The burden
is on them to show that there is a plausible view that speaks in favor of the
Positive View.3 Until then, the defenders of the Negative View have no rea-
son to worry about the metaphysical objection.
4. The Explanatory Objection. The third line of criticism of the Negative
View is prima facie the most promising. The explanatory critics avoid the pit-
falls of the other reponses by recognizing that the debate over the scope of nat-
ural selection explanation requires us to distinguish it from developmental ex-
planation and by conceding that origin essentialism is a plausible view about
the metaphysics of identity. The explanatory critics instead argue that the Neg-3. Although origin essentialism has also been criticized in the broader metaphysics lit-
erature, it is doubtful whether the defenders of the Positive View can draw on these dis-
cussions. As Sartorelli (2015) has recently pointed out, debates in metaphysics have
problematically conflated issues about identity for biological and nonbiological cases.
It is far from obvious that arguments against origin essentialism for chairs and tables ap-
ply equally to reproducing biological entities like organisms.
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NATURAL SELECTION AND CONTRASTIVE EXPLANATION 417ative View is rooted in a rudimentary conception of explanation. Better philo-
sophically motivated criteria of explanatory relevance show that artificial and
natural selection explanation come apart in away that favors the PositiveView.
Nanay (2005, 2010) and Birch (2012) have developed arguments along
these lines. Nanay’s argument has already been rebutted successfully by
Stegmann (2010a, 2010b) and Helgeson (2013). They have shown that Nanay
misinterprets the modal implications of the counterfactual dependence claims,
which he thinks speak in favor of the Positive View. I concur, but in what fol-
lows I provide a further diagnosis of what I take to be amore fundamental mis-
understanding about the nature of contrastive explanation that underlies
Nanay’s errors. With this misunderstanding in view, we can also see where
Birch’s account—which has not received any convincing responses—takes
a wrong turn. That will be the topic of section 5.
4.1. Nanay on Explanation and Counterfactuals. Nanay (2005) argues
that for any environment in which resources are limited and in which there is a
selective gradient over two or more different trait types, natural selection can
help explain of an individual O why it has the traits it does. He reasons as fol-
lows: “The fact that O inherited trait A from her mother is explanatorily rele-
vant to O’s having trait A. But, O could not have inherited A from her mother
unless her mother had reached reproductive age. Further,O’s mother could not
have had trait A and reached reproductive age unless O’s uncle (who did not
have trait A) had died. Therefore, the fact thatO’s uncle (who did not have trait
A) died is explanatorily relevant to the fact that O has trait A” (Nanay 2005,
1104). Nanay concludes from this that O’s possession of trait A depends
counterfactually on selection favoring O’s mother over O’s uncle. Therefore,
selection helps explain why O has A.
Stegmann (2010b) has pointed out that this formulation of what natural se-
lection explains fails to capture the contrastive nature of the explanandum at
issue. What needs explaining is not why O has trait A but why O has trait A
rather than B. In response, Nanay (2010) refined his argument and presented
it in the following revised form:(1)
(2)
All use sO’s having A (rather than B) depends counterfactually on O’s mother
surviving to reproductive age and having A.
O’s mother surviving to reproductive age and having trait A (rather than
B) depends counterfactually on selection against organismswith trait B.
(Nanay 2010, 419; symbols modified)If 1 and 2 are true, it follows thatO’s having A rather thanB depends counter-
factually on selection against B-type organisms. However, as both Stegmann
(2010a) and Helgeson (2013) have pointed out, even this revised version ofThis content downloaded from 130.226.230.200 on September 30, 2019 05:12:01 AM
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All uNanay’s argument fails because the counterfactual dependence relation in 1
does not obtain.4
To see why 1 is false, consider that for any counterfactual dependence re-
lation of the form “P depends counterfactually on Q” it must hold true that
had Q not occurred, P would have failed to obtain. For counterfactuals like
1, in whichP is contrastive, we can add that hadQ not occurred,Pwould have
failed to obtain in a particular way: the contrast expressed by P must have
been reversed. To see why this is a requirement for counterfactuals with a
contrastive antecedent, consider a simple example: if Sam being home before
rather than after dinner counterfactually depends on his train running on time,
it follows that if his train does not run on time, Sam is home after dinner rather
than before dinner. The counterfactual in 1 has the additional complication
that the consequent Q is a conjunction. For a counterfactual of this kind to
be true, the contrastive antecedent must be reversed if at least one of the con-
juncts is false. Another example helps to illustrate this requirement: if Sam
going ice skating rather than roller skating (the contrastive antecedent P) coun-
terfactually depends on it freezing outside and on his ice skates being sharp
(the conjunctive consequentQ) it follows that Samwill go roller skating rather
than ice skating if it is not freezing or if his ice skates are not sharp or if both
obtain. Now, applied to the counterfactual dependence relation in 1, this means
that for it to hold, all of the following statements must be true:(3)
(4)
(5)
4. Stegma
to show th
down.
Th
se subject tHad O’s mother survived to reproductive age and had she not had trait
A, then O would have had trait B (rather than A).
Had O’s mother not survived to reproductive age and had she not had
trait A, then O would have had trait B (rather than A).
Had O’s mother not survived to reproductive age and had she had trait
A, then O would have had trait B (rather than A).Statement 3 is true: given the setup of the example, it follows fromO’s mother
not having had trait A that she must have had trait B, which, given her repro-
ductive success, would have been inherited byO. But 4 and 5 are clearly false:
ifO’smother had failed to produce any offspring,Owould not have possessed
traitB rather thanA.O not having been born in those cases, it would have pos-
sessed neither B nor A. Since all of 3, 4, and 5 need to be true for 1 to hold, we
can conclude that 1 is false: O’s having A rather than B does not depend
counterfactually on a condition that includes its mother’s survival as one ofnn (2010a) also argues that 2 is problematic, but for present purposes it suffices
at 1 fails. If 1 fails, Nanay’s argument for the Positive View inevitably breaks
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NATURAL SELECTION AND CONTRASTIVE EXPLANATION 419its conjuncts. This is sufficient for Nanay’s defense of the Positive View to
break down, since on his account it is the survival of O’s mother that links
the explanation of O’s having A rather than B to natural selection (via prem-
ise 2).
4.2. Nanay’s Error, Contrastive Explanation, and Presupposition. Al-
though I believe that the preceding analysis of Nanay’s counterfactuals is cor-
rect, it does not strike me as a particularly intuitive and insightful account of
where his reasoning takes a wrong turn. Fortunately, there is a more straightfor-
ward way of seeing why and how Nanay’s argument fails, based on consider-
ations about the nature of contrastive explanation.
In essence, Nanay’s argument fails because it violates the requirement that
explanantia for contrastive explananda need to satisfy their explanatory pre-
suppositions. Consider a request for explanation of the form “Why P rather
Q?” This explanandum presupposes that either fact P or foil Q occurs (Lipton
2004, 35ff.; Hitchcock 2013). If I ask “Why is Rose watching a movie rather
than Thom playing a video game,” I am presupposing that either Rose watches
a movie or Thom is playing a video game and that there is an explanation for
why one rather than another occurred. If you respond that Thom could have
played a video game while Rose watched a movie, you are not answering my
question, which presupposes that just one of the two activities occurred. You
either misunderstood the question, or you are rejecting the presupposition
that only one of the two activities could occur. For a response to count as an
answer, it must satisfy the presupposition.
A contrastive question of the form “Why doesO have A rather than B?” in-
troduces a further presupposition. Apart from presupposing that either A or B
obtains, it presupposes that O exists. If I ask why Thom has blue eyes rather
than brown eyes, I am asking something about Thom only. If you answer by
saying “If Thom had not existed, then . . . ,” you have misunderstood what
I was asking for. My question presupposed that Thom exists and that he has
either blue or brown eyes.
It can be easy to overlook explanatory presuppositions because the gram-
mar of contrastive questions often hides them from our view. In English, the
presupposition remains partially hidden in sentences with a rather-than locu-
tion, because these take a noun phrase rather than a clause as their completion
(Hitchcock 2013, 13). We ask, “Why does Thom have blue eyes rather than
brown eyes” and not “Why does Thom have blue eyes rather than Thom have
brown eyes?” Although the latter sentence is ungrammatical, it does a better
job at bringing out the presupposition that Thom exists and has one or the other
eye color. We can, however, use a different linguistic device to make the pre-
supposition evident. Instead of asking “Why does Thom have blue rather than
brown eyes?” we could ask “Given that Thom exists, why does he have blue
rather than brown eyes?” The given locution makes salient that a particular el-This content downloaded from 130.226.230.200 on September 30, 2019 05:12:01 AM
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All uement needs to be satisfied by a response for it to count as a potential answer
to the explanandum (Sober 1986).
With these considerations about explanatory presupposition in mind, it be-
comes easy to see why Nanay’s defense of the Positive View fails. If we re-
phrase the question “Why doesO have trait A rather than B?” as “Given that
O exists, why does it have trait A rather than B?” it becomes instantly clear that
a response of the sort “If O had not existed, then . . .” does not qualify as an
answer. It fails to satisfy the presupposition that O exists and, therefore, fails to
answer the question. This is precisely the problem that Nanay’s account faces.
We have seen that on his analysis a difference in natural selection can onlymake
a difference to the existence or nonexistence ofO. Hence, natural selection can-
not feature in the explanation of whyO has the trait it has when it exists. There-
fore, natural selection must fail as an answer to the question “Why doesO have
trait A rather than B?”
To sum up, Nanay’s critique of the Negative View is unsuccessful because
it fails to recognize an elementary requirement on contrastive explanation. A
contrastive explanation of a fact about a given organism requires us to presup-
pose the existence of that organism. Natural selection explanations do not sat-
isfy this presupposition. Natural selection may help explain why an organism
exists but not why, given that it exists, it has one trait rather than another.
5. The Explanatory Objection and the Argument from Overdetermi-
nation. Like Nanay, Birch (2012) has aimed to vindicate the Positive View
by examining the nature of the counterfactual dependence relation between
natural selection and the traits an individual has. However, Birch’s argument
unfolds in an importantly different and at first glancemore promising way. Be-
fore offering an account of contrastive explanation that he claims supports the
Positive View, Birch provides a close analysis of the criterion for explanatory
relevance that defenses of the Negative View rely on. He argues that this crite-
rion is flawed because it cannot handle commonplace cases of causal overde-
termination.
Before considering Birch’s arguments in detail, it is worth noting that the
responses it has received so far do not do it justice. First, considerMcLoone’s
(2013) claim that we can safely ignore Birch’s criticism of the criterion for ex-
planatory relevance that theNegativeView is said to rely on, because it is sim-
ply what “traditional versions of the Negative View assume.” When Birch
offers an alternative criterion, he has “changed the rules of the game by chang-
ing the sense of ‘explanation’ used” (343). This criticism misses the point.
If Birch is right about there being a viable alternative account of contrastive
explanation onwhich selection is deemed to be relevant to the explanation of
an individual’s traits, then surely we should not ignore that account—let
alone reject it—simply because it goes against “tradition.” Instead of brush-
ing Birch’s alternative aside for being an alternative, the defender of theThis content downloaded from 130.226.230.200 on September 30, 2019 05:12:01 AM
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NATURAL SELECTION AND CONTRASTIVE EXPLANATION 421Negative View should argue that it fails as an alternative. In fact, McLoone’s
response should impel us to take Birch’s argument even more seriously, be-
cause it suggests that Birch has at least correctly identified the explanatory
criterion that proponents of theNegativeView rely on—a criterion that Birch
argues is flawed.
A second response to Birch’s account has come from Helgeson (2015). In
the conclusion of his critique of the metaphysical objection to the Negative
View, Helgeson extends his discussion to Birch’s argument by pointing out
that although it “concedes origin essentialism for the sake of argument . . . or-
igin essentialism is a purported necessary condition for trans-world identity; it
is never regarded as remotely sufficient. What the Positive View requires is a
sufficient condition. Birch’s novel criterion for picking the relevant counterfac-
tual scenario in no way reduces the need for a standard of judging whether
an organism in that scenario is the same individual as the actual organism of
interest” (28). This response is puzzling, since Birch makes amply clear that
he accepts the theoretical and metaphysical assumptions of the Negative View
wholesale (2012, 571). The problem of having to provide alternative necessary
and sufficient conditions for establishing modal identity conditions is only
faced by those who push the metaphysical line of criticism (i.e., those who
deny origin essentialism). Helgeson’s remarks suggest that he takes Birch to
be presenting a variant of themetaphysical response to theNegativeView. This
is amistake; Birch criticizes this view only on explanatory grounds.Metaphys-
ically speaking, the plausibility of his account is on a par with the Negative
View. Again, the only proper response is to take a closer look at the substance
of Birch’s argument. Let us do that now.
5.1. Birch’s Counterexamples of Causal Overdetermination. Birch pro-
ceeds from the observation that all current defenses of theNegativeView rely
on the following simple counterfactual criterion (SCC) for contrastive-
explanatory relevance:All SCC: Cause C rather than C* helps explain why outcome E rather than E*
occurred only if: (if C* had occurred, then E* would have occurred).Applied to natural selection as causal factor, this becomes a simple counter-
factual criterion of selection (SCCS):SCCS: Natural selection favoring trait A rather than trait B helps explain
why organism O has trait A rather than B only if: (if selection had favored
trait B over A, then O would have possessed trait B).According to Birch, supporters of the Negative View argue that the truth of
their view follows from the fact that the SCCS is never satisfied. They holdThis content downloaded from 130.226.230.200 on September 30, 2019 05:12:01 AM
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All uthat counterfactual natural selection for B over A either results inO never be-
ing born, because selection for B is so strong that O’s parent or parents die
before reproducing, or results in O being born without selection affecting
which trait it has, because selection favoring B does not cause O to have
B: inheritance, mutation, and development do. Either way, natural selection
for B over A fails to cause O to have B. Therefore, SCCS fails.5
Birch agrees that if the SCCS is the right criterion for passing judgment on
the scope of natural selection explanation, it follows that natural selection
cannot help explain why individuals have the traits they do. However, Birch
denies that the SCCS is the right criterion. He argues that the SCC that un-
derpins it constitutes “a proto-theory of contrastive explanation . . . [which]
turns out to be highly questionable” (Birch 2012, 571). The reason the SCC
fails is that it cannot handle simple “biologically commonplace” cases of
causal overdetermination that it should be able to handle (571).
Birch builds his case against the SCC by first considering a nonbiological
example of causal overdetermination. Suppose that your train ride from Lon-
don to Paris gets canceled because of two independent causal factors: the train
drivers are on strike and there are leaves on the track. As a result, you are stuck
in London (outcome E) instead of arriving in Paris (outcome E*). The strike
and the leaves are overdetermining causes of E: if one of them had not oc-
curred, the other would have still guaranteed that you remain stuck in London.6
Birch concludes that both causes fail to satisfy the SCC: for each cause, its con-
trast does not result in the occurrence E*. Thus, according to the SCC, neither
the leaves nor the strike help explainwhy you are in stuck in London instead of
having arrived in Paris. And yet, wewouldwant to say that both the leaves and
the strike help explain why you are in London instead of Paris. The SCC gets it
wrong, it seems.
Birch argues that similar cases of overdetermination pervade biology.
Consider his example of mothM. We would like to know whether the paren-
tal genotype of this moth helps explain why it has dark coloration (outcome
E) rather than pale coloration (outcome E*). Suppose that the coloration ofM
is fully determined by inheritance of either of two possible alleles: a dark al-5. The SCCS fails to make allowances for those defenders of the Negative View that have
formulated the contrastive criterion in probabilistic terms (Razeto-Barry and Frick 2011;
McLoone 2013). To account for these, the SCCS could be rewritten in a probabilistic form,
as follows: “Natural selection favoring traitA rather than traitB helps explain why organism
O has trait A rather than B only if: (if selection had favored traitB over A, then Pr(O has trait
B) > Pr(O has trait A)).” However, for the remainder of the discussion nothing depends on
whether a deterministic or a probabilistic approach is adopted. For sake of simplicity, I there-
fore focus on Birch’s formulation of the SCCS only.
6. It is assumed in Birch’s example that the strike and the leaves are time-symmetric causes.
If they were time asymmetric (e.g., if the strike had begun before the leaves fell on the track)
the example would be one of causal preemption instead of causal overdetermination.
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NATURAL SELECTION AND CONTRASTIVE EXPLANATION 423lele (cause C) or a pale allele (cause C*). Also suppose that there was strong
selection for dark over pale coloration in the generation ofM’s parents, such
that had they possessed the pale allele rather than the dark one, they would
have died before being able to reproduce. Birch concludes:All As a result it is false that, if M’s parents had possessed the pale allele, M
would have possessed pale coloration. Not-E* (i.e., the non-instantiation
of pale coloration by the offspringmoth) is overdetermined by two indepen-
dent factors (namely, the parental genotype, and the strong selection against
the pale allele) in exactly the same way that my non-arrival in Paris was
overdetermined by two independent factors. The information thatM’s par-
ents possessed the dark allele rather than the pale allele consequently fails to
satisfy SCC. Hence, either SCC is defective in this context, or parental al-
leles are genuinely irrelevant to the explanation of offspring traits. The latter
possibility seems sufficiently absurd to warrant a preference for the former.
(Birch 2012, 572)In short, Birch argues that we should reject the SCC applied to the inheritance
of parental genotypes, since this criterion erroneously judges parental geno-
types to have no explanatory relevance to offspring traits. And if the SCC is
mistaken about the explanatory relevance of parental genotypes, this gives
reason to think that it may be defective in general and, therefore, also in its
application to natural selection in the form of the SCCS.
5.2. Overdetermination and Explanatory Relevance. In this section I
argue that Birch’s analysis fails to show that the Negative View relies on a
problematic criterion for explanatory relevance. First, I show that the exam-
ple ofmothM does not give us any reason to doubt the soundness of the SCC.
Next, I argue that even if we concede that the train cancellation example does
present a genuine case of causal overdetermination and thereby throws the
SCC into doubt, this does not unsettle the Negative View in any way.
Let us start by taking a closer look at Birch’s claim that in the example of
mothM the nonoccurrence of outcome E* is overdetermined. What does this
outcome not-E* amount to? Birch describes it as “the non-instantiation of pale
coloration by the offspringmoth,” but this is ambiguous between two different
outcomes: one in whichM exists but does not have pale coloration and one in
which pale coloration is not instantiated byM because it does not exist. Which
of these interpretations supports Birch’s claim that not-E* is overdetermined?
Consider the first interpretation of not-E*, as “M exists but does not have
pale coloration.” Given that the contrastive setup of the example presupposes
that M has either dark or pale coloration, M existing without pale coloration
implies that it has dark coloration. In other words, the first reading of outcome
not-E* equates to the occurrence of outcome E. Yet, it is easy to see that out-
come E is not causally overdetermined. A dark parental genotype and a selec-This content downloaded from 130.226.230.200 on September 30, 2019 05:12:01 AM
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dark coloration: a change in selective regime can affect whether M exists but
not which color it has. In those scenarios in which M does exist, the parental
genotype is the only factor that is causally relevant to its coloration.
This leaves us with the second interpretation of not-E*, as “M does not ex-
ist (and therefore fails to instantiate pale coloration).” For this outcome to be
causally overdetermined, selection against paleness and a pale parental geno-
type must independently guaranteeM’s nonexistence. Yet, the pale parental
genotype clearly does not satisfy this condition. If there had been no selective
pressure against the pale parental genotype, such thatM’s parents could have
reproduced, their pale genotype would not have preventedM from being born.
Instead, M would have been born with pale coloration.
We can conclude, then, that Birch was wrong about the example of mothM:
on neither interpretation of the outcome not-E* does it present us with a case
of causal overdetermination. But there is a further problem with this example.
On closer inspection, it appears that it fails to present a genuine test of the SCC
in the first place. Remember that the SCC offers a criterion for determining
whether the occurrence of C rather than C* answers the contrastive explanan-
dum “Why E rather than E*?”Applied to the case of mothM, this comes down
to the question whether the occurrence of a dark parental genotype (C) rather
than a pale parental genotype (C*) helps explain why M has dark (E) rather
than pale (E*) coloration. Now, as we have seen in section 4.2, the explanan-
dum “Why doesM have dark rather than pale coloration?” requires us to pre-
suppose thatM exists in order to answer why it has one color rather than an-
other.7 Considerations about counterfactual scenarios in which M fails to exist
are irrelevant to answering why M has a certain color in those scenarios in
which it does exist. Yet, the only counterfactual scenario that Birch evaluates
is one in whichM does not exist, since selection has prevented its parents from
reproducing. Hence, Birch has not presented us with an actual test of the SCC.
In order to test the SCC, we need to consider the counterfactual situation in
whichM exists with pale coloration (E*) and ask whether the pale parental
genotype (C*) is the cause of M being pale (rather than dark). Clearly, the
answer is positive: M’s inheritance of a pale genotype rather than a dark one
caused it to have pale rather than dark coloration. But this means that the SCC
gets it right: the occurrence of C* accounts for the occurrence of E*.
To summarize, Birch’s example of moth M fails to show that the SCC is
flawed because (a) it fails to make a case for causal overdetermination that
can be held against the SCC and (b) the example as presented by Birch does7. We could make this explanatory presupposition explicit by writing SCC in the follow-
ing, logically equivalent form: “Given x: (C rather than C* helps explain why Fx rather
than Gx, only if: (if C* had occurred, then Gx)).” In the case at hand x refers toM’s exis-
tence, and F and G are alternative colorations.
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NATURAL SELECTION AND CONTRASTIVE EXPLANATION 425not constitute a test of SCC at all. This second point illustrates that Birch has
failed to comply with the basic requirement on contrastive explanation that
admissible answers to contrastive explananda need to respect their explana-
tory presuppositions. Birch has overlooked that a response to the question
“Why does O have trait T rather than T 0?” needs to presuppose that O exists
for it to count as an answer to this question.
This leaves us with the example of the train cancellation. Even though this
is not an example that involves natural selection, one might argue that it still
poses trouble for the Negative View by showing that the SCC (and by impli-
cation, the SCCS) cannot deal with cases of causal overdetermination. The
worry would be that the defenders of the Negative View have unwittingly
drawn on cases in which natural selection is an overdetermining cause. The
inability of the SCC to detect the explanatory relevance of natural selection
in those instances would then explain why they have arrived at the erroneous
conclusion that the Negative View is true.
Whether defenders of the Negative View have made this error should be
easy to ascertain. All we need to do is check whether natural selection can
affect the traits an organism has in scenarios that control for causal overdeter-
mination. If natural selection is not a cause of an individual’s traits in those
scenarios, we know that it cannot be an overdetermining cause either. What
we should do, then, is consider the following criterion for contrastive explan-
atory relevance:All SCCS0: Natural selection favoring trait A rather than trait B helps explain
why organism O has trait A rather than B only if: (if selection had favored
traitB overA and no independent factorD causedO to exist and possess trait
A, then O would have existed and possessed trait B).It is easy to see that, using this criterion, natural selection still comes out as hav-
ing no explanatory relevance. Just consider the case of the dark-colored moth
Mwith its dark-colored parents once more. If selection had favored pale geno-
types in the parental generation and there had not been any causal factor that
independently guaranteedM to exist and have dark coloration, wouldM then
have existed and been pale? The answer is that it would not. There are two pos-
sible outcomes of a scenario in whichM’s dark-colored parents are subject to a
selective regime that favors paleness. First, if selection for paleness is suffi-
ciently strong,M’s parents fail to reproduce, andM is not born. Second, if se-
lection for paleness is weak enough forM to be born, the selective favoring of
one trait rather than another fails to contrastively explainM’s existence, since
M exists regardless of which trait is favored. Thus, natural selection can at most
explain whether O exists or not. If O exists, natural selection cannot make a
difference to how it exists. Inheritance, mutation, and development will ex-
plain why, whenO exists, it has the traits it does.This content downloaded from 130.226.230.200 on September 30, 2019 05:12:01 AM
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by applying the SCCS0, a difference in the selective regime cannot make a dif-
ference to which traits an organism possesses. Therefore, selection is causally
irrelevant to explaining why a given organism has the traits it does. And if nat-
ural selection is not a relevant cause of an organism’s traits, we can exclude the
possibility that it features as an overdetermining cause in tests of the SCCS.
Thus, although overdetermination may present a problem for the SCC, it can-
not present an objection to the SCCS. The problem of overdetermining causes
never arises for the SCCS.
6. Room for a Positive View? Since Birch’s argument against the SCCS
fails, his account does not give any immediate reason to think that the Neg-
ative View is in trouble. Nevertheless, it is worth considering the alternative
counterfactual criterion he introduces. If Birch is right that this alternative ac-
count of contrastive explanation supports the Positive View of natural selec-
tion explanation, further work will be needed to determine which account of
contrastive explanation is to be preferred.
The alternativeBirch offers is adapted fromStrevens (2008), who presents
his account of contrastive explanation in the form of a recipe. Strevens pro-
poses that in order to explain why outcome E rather than E* occurred, we
need to construct two separate explanatory models that satisfy the following
conditions:se sub(1) The model for E is veridical; it is a (noncontrastive) standalone expla-
nation for why E occurred.
(2) The model for E* is veridical except for one or more states of affairs
that you might call the switching events. The model falsely represents
the switching events as not having occurred.
(3) Each of the switching events appears in the model for E. They are
therefore difference-makers for E.
(4) The model for E* is in some sense the most plausible story as to how
E* might have occurred. (Perhaps it is the model instantiated in the
closest possible world in which E* occurs.) (Strevens 2008, 175; sym-
bols modified)To illustrate the application of this recipe, Strevens gives the example of ex-
plaining why Rasputin was murdered by being drowned rather than by being
thrown into a volcanic crater. The two causalmodels for this contrast agree that
Rasputin was murdered but disagree on the method. They differ with regard to
two switching events: the actual model contains a river whereas the counter-
factual one does not (switch 1), and the actual model contains no nearby vol-
cano whereas the counterfactual model does (switch 2). On the basis of these
two models, we can say that the explanation for why Rasputin was influviatedThis content downloaded from 130.226.230.200 on September 30, 2019 05:12:01 AM
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NATURAL SELECTION AND CONTRASTIVE EXPLANATION 427rather than incinerated is that a river rather than a crater was available (Strevens
2008, 176).
Birch contends that by using Strevens’s account it can be shown that natural
selection helps explain why an individual has the traits it does. The selective
regime can feature as a switching event in a Strevens-style pair of models.
Birch illustrates this using an example reproduced here as figure 1. It depicts
an actual and a counterfactual model of inheritance and selection in a popula-
tion of asexual individuals with two loci and four possible genotypes: AB, Ab,
aB, and ab. Birch argues that, according to Strevens’s procedure, natural selec-
tion helps explain why outcome E (O6 having genotype AB) rather than out-
come E* (O6 having genotype ab) occurred. Here is why:All To apply Strevens’s procedure, we consider the most plausible model of
how O6 might have ended up with ab. This is, of course, a model in which
the relevant mutations do appear in O6’s lineage. But it is also a model in
which the selection pressures are different; for, had they been the same,
the mutations would not have been passed down to O6 (indeed, O6 would
never have existed). There are therefore multiple switching events: muta-
tions which in fact failed to occur would have needed to occur, and selection
pressureswhich actually obtainedwould have needed to be different. (Birch
2012, 572–73)I agree that if the selective regime could function a switching event in a set
of models for which trait a given organism inherits, natural selection would
help explain why that organism has the traits it does. However, I believe that
something is amiss with Birch’s argument for why the selective regime can
indeed count as a switching event. Remember the question we are aiming
to answer: “Why does O6 have AB rather than ab?” This explanandum pre-
supposes that O6 exists and has either AB or ab. The switching events that
appear in the relevant models for answering this contrastive question must
therefore be factors that make a difference to whetherO6, given that it exists,Figure 1. Left, model in which individual O6 inherits genotype AB after selection
for AB. Right, counterfactual model in which individual O6 inherits genotype ab af-
ter selection for ab. (Drawn after Birch [2012] figs. 2 and 3.)This content downloaded from 130.226.230.200 on September 30, 2019 05:12:01 AM
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combine to present a difference that makes a difference to which traits O6
has; they are switching events. But the selective regime is not a difference
maker of this kind: a change in the selective regime does not constitute a dif-
ference that makes a difference to which traits O6 inherits; it only determines
whetherO6 comes to exist. In fact, Birch admits this muchwhen he states that
selection only affects whether a given genotype can be “passed down” to O6
by causing it to be born. In other words, Birch’s error has been to think that
the change in selective pressures that is required to make the counterfactual
model aboutO6 can also feature in the counterfactualmodel ofO6 as a switch-
ing event.
One might object that even if natural selection as such cannot make a dif-
ference toO6’s traits, it nevertheless contributes something to the contrastive
explanation of O6’s traits by showing that a difference in selection is needed
to satisfy the presupposition that O6 exists in the counterfactual scenario. In
the actual scenario, the birth of O6 requires selection for AB in the two gen-
erations downstream from O1, whereas in the counterfactual scenario it re-
quires selection for Ab and selection for ab in these generations. One could
argue that natural selection is therefore part of an “inclusive contrastive ex-
planation” of O6’s traits.8
The problem with this response is that it either collapses into a defense of
the Negative View or presents a confused notion of contrastive explanation.
The first outcome results if an “inclusive contrastive explanation” is under-
stood to be a conjunction of two contrastive explanations: a combination of
the answer to the question “Why does O6 exist rather than not?” that refers
to natural selection and the answer to the question “Why, given that O6 exists,
does it have AB rather than ab?” that refers to inheritance and mutation in its
lineal ancestors. This pair of explanations fails to challenge the Negative View.
Defenders of the Negative View do not disagree with the answer to the first
question, and their view is vindicated by the answer to the second question:
for any given organism natural selection does not help explain why that organ-
ism has the traits it does.
Alternatively, one might take an “inclusive contrastive explanation” to be
a singular explanans for a unified explanandum of the form “Why does O6
exist rather than not, having the traits it does?”However, this explanandum is
ill formed. It calls for an answer that explains the existence ofO6 while simul-
taneously presupposing its existence. No single explanans can satisfy these
two demands. An answer that presupposes O6’s existence will fail to explain
why O6 exists, while an answer that explains O6’s existence will fail to pre-
suppose that it exists in order to explain why it has the traits it does.8. I thank a reviewer for raising this objection.
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NATURAL SELECTION AND CONTRASTIVE EXPLANATION 429We can conclude that Birch’s attempt to save the Positive View fails. Con-
trary to what he argued, Strevens’s account of contrastive explanation supports
the Negative View rather than the Positive View. Moreover, we have seen that
in his attempt to argue for the Positive View, Birch commits the same error as
we already encountered in Nanay’s account. Both of them fail to recognize the
essential role of explanatory presuppositions in requests for contrastive expla-
nation.Neither has fully come to gripswith the fact that presuppositions are not
the target of contrastive explanantia but need to be assumed by responses to
count as relevant explanantia. An explanation of why an organism has certain
traits rather than others needs to presuppose that this organism exists, rather
than account for it.
7. Conclusion. I have argued that the empirical response to the Negative
View misses the mark and provided additional reasons to conclude that the
metaphysical response has no teeth. The explanatory response, beingwell tar-
geted and metaphysically unproblematic, seemed like a promising candidate
to topple the Negative View. Moreover, an important defense of the Positive
View along these lines had not received any convincing rebuttal. However, I
have argued that the explanatory response fails nonetheless. Not the defend-
ers of the Negative View but their critics make an error about the nature of
contrastive explanation. The critics overlook that, since natural selection al-
ready features as presupposition in the explanation of why a selected indi-
vidual has the traits it does, it cannot also feature in the explanation itself.REFERENCES
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